ANTICIPATION

OF THE

Freedom of Brabant, &c.

ANTICIPATION

1792

OF THE

FREEDOM OF BRABANT,

WITH

THE EXPULSION

OF THE

Auſtrian Troops from that Country;

WITH SOME

REMARKS

ON THE

FUTURE EXTENSION

OF THE

FRENCH FRONTIER TO THE RHINE:

Inveſtigated according to the Principles laid down in the Works of

GENERAL LLOYD.

TOGETHER WITH SOME

MILITARY OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

Late intended March of the Duke of Brunſwick to Paris.

By MAJOR GEORGE HANGER.

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INTRODUCTION.

I SHOULD make this Pamphlet too large were I to tranſcribe every one of the military maxims and rules by which I have been guided in writing the following Pages, which our celebrated General lays down both for an *offenſive* and *defenſive* war, and relative to the *line of operation* and the *line of communication* which every General not only ought, but muſt poſitively maintain between his army and his *Depots*, which, if he does not ſecure, muſt ultimately terminate in his diſgrace and retreat. Therefore, I ſhall content myſelf with extracting a few, the moſt eſſential to be attended to, from thoſe Works, which muſt ever immortalize that General in the mind of every intelligent military Reader, and requeſt them, for further information as to the imagined loſs of Brabant to the Auſtrians, and the extenſion of the French Fron-

tier as far as to the River Rhine, to turn to that Officer's Works, and, with the GREATEST ATTENTION, peruſe from page 133 to page 149, vol. II. in which are contained his remarks and inſtructions on the *line of operation, an offenſive war, and a defenſive war.* Alſo page 151 and 152, in which are ſome ſhort remarks on Frontier Lines in general; and page 152 to page 161, in which are compriſed that General's Deſcription of the whole Frontier Line of France.

LLOYD, Vol. II. Page 160.

WE have already ſhewn that France has *great advantages* in *attacking Flanders,* from the proximity of its Depots, which are greatly increaſed by the Auſtrian Line of Operation from Vienna to Bruſſels, which makes it *impoſſible* for them *to preſerve that country.* It was, no doubt, owing to *this circumſtance* chiefly, if not entirely, that the Houſe of Auſtria could not preſerve Alſace, Franche Comté, and Lorrain, which *finally will bring on the loſs of Flanders.*

LLOYD, Vol. II. Page 157.

THE event of the different wars waged in Flanders proves the ſuperiority of the French (I mean the ſuperior advantages they poſſeſs in acting on that frontier), which are indeed *ſo very great,* that no forces can be collected and ſupported in Flanders by the Houſe of Auſtria, the Engliſh, Dutch, and the German Princes, which can preſerve that country from the efforts of the French. Moſt certainly the Auſtrians *alone cannot* do it.

LLOYD,

LLOYD, Vol. II. Page 133, 134, 136, 137.

OF THE LINE OF OPERATIONS.

THE Tartars neither have, nor want depots; by the rapidity of their motions they muſt and do find every thing on the ſpot. But when we penetrate, with our great and very heavy armies, into an enemy's country, it is with a view to conquer ſome provinces, fortreſſes, &c. and finding nothing upon the road to ſubſiſt upon, we have fixed and determined points to lodge our ſtores and proviſions, from whence they are tranſported to the army, which muſt proceed from thoſe given points to other fixed and determined points in the enemy's country, if you carry on an offenſive war; or from a given point in your own, towards another on the frontiers, if you are on the defenſive.

The line which unites theſe points, on which every army muſt act, is called *the line of operation*; and, of all thoſe we have mentioned, is the moſt important. For on the good or bad choice of this line the final event of the war chiefly depends. If it is ill choſen, all your ſucceſſes, however brilliant, will, in the end, be found uſeleſs.

It is impoſſible to collect and maintain a ſufficient number of horſes, carriages, &c. to ſupply an army of fifty or ſixty thouſand men, including thoſe who follow the camp, with proviſions, ſtores, forage, &c. and to ſupply the convoy, drivers, &c. in their journey to and from the camp, two hundred miles, we ſuppoſe, which cannot be performed in leſs than twenty days. I am ſo convinced myſelf of this, that if you place twenty thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe, on any ſpot, ſo that they ſubſiſt only upon what is brought from one given point, a hundred miles off, they muſt in a week go and meet their convoy, diſperſe, or periſh.

Now, if to these natural and insurmountable difficulties, you add those which an able leader can create by acting on the principles we have established above, it will appear evident, beyond contradiction, that no army, great or small, can act in a line of operation of a hundred miles, provided you can keep the field; of course you must avoid a general action.

That the direction of your line be such that the enemy cannot act on your flanks, and of course on your said line, which must happen if the provinces on the right or left of your march are in his possession. The longer you proceed on such a series, the more certain is your destruction; for in a little time you will have no line at all; you will be entirely surrounded, and you are lost.

If the difficulties are always in proportion to the length of your line of operation, it follows, that when other circumstances are nearly equal, that army which acts on the shortest lines, must from that circumstance alone prevail; even though much inferior, provided it is conducted with prudence and activity.

LLOYD, Vol. II. Page 139, 140, 141, 142, 143.

OF AN OFFENSIVE WAR.

IF the place is situated close on the frontier, then by marching eight or ten miles into the country, you put it behind you, and carry on your siege, without any great obstacle on his part, because your line of operation is short and easily guarded. He cannot force you to abandon your enterprize, but by a victory.

If the place is situated thirty or forty miles within the country, by avoiding a general action, and acting with the greatest part of his forces on your line, he will probably take your convoys, and cut off your communication with your depots, and by that means oblige you to abandon the enterprize; and your

your retreat will be attended with great difficulties, becauſe your army will or may be attacked in front, flank, and rear.

From this I draw one conclusion; if your ſituation is ſuch, that in general you mean to attack your enemy on a given frontier, your fortreſſes can never be too near them, becauſe your line of operation will be the ſhorter.

But if ſuch places are intended to cover the country, they muſt be placed thirty or forty miles from the frontier, unleſs ſome particular circumſtances intervene, as a great river, a paſs, &c.

It is probable the enemy may have ſeveral lines of operation drawn from his camp, wherever it is, to the different fortreſſes and depots which he may have behind him. In this caſe he will play with you a whole campaign, ſhifting from one line to another, without a poſſibility of bringing him to a battle, or of driving him out of the country. Your army will be ſoon exhauſted and wore out with marching and counter-marching, continually changing your line to follow him, till your proviſions fail, and oblige you to retire without attempting any thing with an army now half ruined. This is exactly the caſe in America.

Theſe are, in my opinion, the principles of an offenſive war, deduced from reaſon and experience. Whenever Generals have been regulated by them, for the moſt part they have been crowned with ſucceſs; and, on the contrary, have generally been unfortunate, when they have deviated from them, which is confirmed by hiſtory. It remains with the General to know how to apply them as circumſtances require.

LLOYD.

LLOYD, Vol. II. Page 145, 146, 147, 148.

OF A DEFENSIVE WAR.

NO man, or body of men, can long withſtand an attack in front, and another in flank at the ſame time, or remain in any given poſt, if a powerful corps is placed ſo as to be able to act on its line of operation.

When two armies march againſt you, in the manner juſt mentioned, and come from a conſiderable diſtance; if your country is ſtrong, and has ſome good fortreſs in it, where your depots lay, occupy a ſtrong camp and be quiet; ſuch numerous armies in ſuch a ſituation cannot remain a fortnight; they muſt ſeparate for want of proviſions. In this manner the king of Pruſſia baffled the attempts of the Auſtrians and Ruſſians for four campaigns.

When he has penetrated thirty or forty miles into your country, and you cannot or will not oppoſe him in front; when you cannot defend your own line, you muſt either retire as he advances, till he has drove you out of the country, or attack his. The method of doing this with ſucceſs, we ſay, is, to leave on your line, to oppoſe the enemy in front, a fifth of your army, chiefly cavalry; three-fifths on the flank of his march; the remaining fifth, all of light troops, horſe and foot, muſt be placed along his line of operation in ſmall bodies of one or two thouſand men, who occupy the moſt advantageous ſpots, as woods, paſſes, &c. where they remain concealed. Parties muſt be ſent from one to the other of about a hundred men, ſo that there is not a ſingle point of the enemy's line which you cannot attack with ſucceſs in an inſtant. Half his army cannot protect his convoys on a line of thirty miles. If he ſends two or three ſtrong detachments to eſcort a capital convoy, perhaps of three thouſand waggons, becauſe you have taken or diſperſed his ſmall ones, ſuch a convoy will occupy

near

near thirty miles: I ſuppoſe the eſcort to conſiſt of twenty thouſand men; theſe will be poſted in ſeveral corps, in front, rear, and along the flanks of the march; you are informed of his diſpoſition, you may reinforce that part which we ſuppoſe already placed on his line, whether you do or not. I ſay, that the ten or twelve thouſand light troops may unite in a ſhort time, and be ſuperior to the enemy's eſcort in any given point, and beat it; ſtop the front of the convoy, while your ſmall parties break the carriages, take away the horſes or kill them. If a hundred only of the carriages are deſtroyed, all thoſe which are behind muſt ſtop. The eſcort is chained to the convoy, even to particular points of it. If you cannot beat it, amuſe it by ſkirmiſhing; your parties in the mean time do the buſineſs.

By acting exactly in this manner, the Auſtrians took or deſtroyed a great convoy going from Neiſs to Olmutz, which obliged the king to raiſe the ſiege of that place next morning, and to abandon Bohemia in a few days.

If in the conduct of a defenſive war you adhere to the principles we have laid down, and the enemy's line of operation is only thirty or forty miles long, much more if it is a hundred, you will triumph in the end, and enjoy the fruits of your prudence and activity, which is every thing in war, particularly in a defenſive one, where they muſt ſupply the want of force.

LLOYD, Vol. II. Page 151.

OF THE FRONTIER LINE.

SUPPOSING this line to be like that marked in Plate V. *x. x. x.* &c. which as moſt lines of any conſiderable extent projects in many parts: I ſay, that however extenſive ſuch a line may be, the points on which it can be attacked are determined by the number and quality of the roads which lead to it, and by the poſition and diſtance of the reſpective capitals,

pitals, and other ſtrong places within a hundred miles of it, beyond which no army can act with advantage; that is, no army conſtituted as ours are, can act, if its depots are diſtant above a hundred miles, unleſs there is water-carriage.

If there are no ſuch places of arms at all, or on the one ſide of the frontier line only, it is evident, that no ſolid operation can be executed, and that they can tend only to ravage the country and retire, or to facilitate the operations of ſome other army, acting on another line, which was the caſe with the Ruſſians, during this whole war we are deſcribing. They could not, and the Auſtrians would not avail themſelves of the victories the former had gained at Palrig and Franckfurt on the Oder; ſo that the Ruſſians, unable to fix themſelves on or near that river, were always obliged to retire after a ſhort campaign, becauſe their line of operation was too long.

ANTI-

ANTICIPATION, &c.

[As the ſituation of affairs on the Continent alter every day, and various occurrences happen every moment, it was thought fit that this book ſhould be dated from the 3d of November, the day it was delivered into the printer's hands, and advertiſed in the newſpapers.]

November 3, 1792.

IT certainly was extremely imprudent of Brabant to revolt in the year 1789, without a poſitive aſſurance of ſupport, and ſome European power declaring in their favour; as it was impoſ-

ſible for them to ſucceed againſt ſo forminable a force which Auſtria could bring againſt her when reinforced from her interior Vienna dominions. As it is not my intent to dwell long on what is paſt, but to look forward to what is to come, I ſhall content myſelf by remarking, that however unfortunate the Brabanters were, they might at leaſt have prolonged the war for one campaign longer, in which time many things might, and moſt probably would, have turned out to their advantage. Had they turned their thoughts ſolely to the fortifying of every town on the banks of the Meuſe (but moſt particularly Namur), and never thought of any other operations, but fortified every town on that river as ſtrong as nature and art could have made them; and beſides have thrown up ſtrong batteries and intrenchments on every part of it where it was fordable, which would have well enabled them to have diſputed the paſſage of it; obſtacles not ſo eaſy to be ſurmounted even by the beſt and moſt regular armies. By theſe exertions I am inclined to believe (and I am ſupported in my opinion by many good officers), they might at leaſt have held out a conſiderable time longer, at leaſt

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one campaign; when, as I have ſaid before, great events in their favour might have taken place.

All theſe errors are paſt; let us bury them in oblivion, and proceed to inveſtigate what Brabant at preſent ought to do. Her ſituation is quite different to what it was in the year 1789: a powerful friend now ſtretches out her hand to aſſiſt her, who is as much intereſted in her liberation as herſelf; who will aſſiſt her in obtaining thoſe rights for which ſhe once unſucceſsfully ſtruggled, and every other right, deſire, or advantage, which ſhe may wiſh to enjoy; who will give to the *people* at large the power of forming their own laws by an elective government choſen from the great body of the nation; the only means by which the true ſenſe of any nation can be obtained, whoſe wiſhes are to be allied to her, and agree mutually to protect each other from foreign invaders, and to expel the preſent foe. It is ſo truly to the intereſt of Brabant to be allied to France, and France to Brabant, that I think it cannot poſſibly eſcape the ideas of ſo many bright and enlightened characters in both thoſe nations. France, for ages paſt, has been a

great nation without any assistance from Brabant: on the contrary, she has been at war with the powers who have possessed that country: and all these exertions, great as they were, have only tended to prove the strength of the French frontier on that side, and the wonderful resources and powers of France when she has turned the springs and sinews of her government to the defence of her country *by land* *. This plainly shews that

* Lloyd, vol. ii. page 156 and 157.—In the war for the succession of Spain, at the beginning of this century, *ten successful campaigns* brought the Allies no farther than Landrecy, *not* thirty miles from the Austrian frontiers. A very inconsiderable defeat at Denain obliged Prince Eugene to raise the siege of that place, and in a short time abandon his conquests, the fruits of many victories.

I know most people suppose that this were owing to the defection of the English: had this never taken place, perhaps the Allies might in time have advanced to the Marne, and sent parties to the Segue; but will any officer suppose that any army marching that line from Mons, Tournay, &c. could separate and take winter quarters on the above-mentioned rivers, while the French were in possession of Picardy, Normandy, and Champagne?—No, it is impossible. The great *fault* of the French generals, when on the *defensive*, was to *oppose* the enemy *in front*, whereas they should have *operated* against their *flanks*.

France

France can be great and powerful without the aſſiſtance of Brabant: but I take on me to affirm, that, by her own exertions ſolely, Brabant never can be great and free, and form her own government: ſhe muſt ſeek the aſſiſtance of ſome powerful ſtate to liberate her. France now offers her friendly aid; therefore, this is the time and the only time for Brabant to ſtrike: if ſhe lets ſlip this great advantage offered her by France ſhe will repent it. An alliance between Brabant and France is ſufficient to make both countries perfectly at their eaſe. The French frontier line will be trebly ſtrong from its being ſhortened nearly one third in extent, and her Netherlands abſolutely will be unattackable. What a great acquiſition! The advantages to Brabant alſo are immenſe by ſuch an alliance. I confeſs the advantages will be greater to France; but what of that, when both countries will be moſt materially benefitted; which I hope to be able to prove in the ſequel of this book. It is an object of ſo much conſequence to them both, that I think it is impoſſible they ſhould not perceive it and adopt it.

From

From the very beginning of this combined invaſion of France, I have been ſtrongly inclined to believe that Auſtria (in the end) is the power that will ſuffer the moſt. For, after one unſucceſsful campaign, Pruſſia (if ſhe perceives no certain means of being paid her expences incurred by the war, either in money, or by the ceding of ſome rich territory to her), will moſt likely withdraw her troops, and will not eaſily be prevailed upon to attempt any further operations againſt France, and will be happy to ſee Auſtria left in the ſcrape to extricate herſelf as well as ſhe can. For what tends to the diminution of the power and riches of the Houſe of Auſtria muſt be congenial to the wiſhes of Pruſſia, they having been for an age paſt rival enemies in Germany, and muſt ſo remain, from the ſituation of their territories, that ſubject them to perpetual diſputes and jealouſies, which at laſt are terminated only by war. I ſhall not ſpeak at preſent of the ſituation of Poland with the ambitious views of Ruſſia in that country, who may perhaps further extend them to the poſſeſſion of Dantzick (which is ſhrewdly ſupected), which may alſo make it expedient for Pruſſia to

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preſerve her armies for the protection of her own dominions, and may perhaps call her attention elſewhere.

But if Auſtria and Pruſſia ſhall continue to co-operate reſolutely together, and perſiſt vigorouſly in mutual operations this winter, and continue them next campaign, they jointly might keep poſſeſſion of a great part of Brabant and Luxembourg, and alſo perhaps take poſſeſſion of a part of Alſace and Lorrain (which they ought to have done at firſt before they had ever attempted any operations into the interior parts of France), and keep thoſe provinces in hot water; but before they conquer and poſſeſs either Alſace or Lorrain, many capital fortreſſes muſt firſt be ſubdued, which is not to be done in an hour or a day, without which it will be impoſſible for them ever to winter in thoſe countries; therefore what will be the uſe of their marching into them and out again if they cannot fix themſelves firmly and ſolidly in the country, which cannot be done until they have reduced all the great fortreſſes; and as not one at preſent is in their hands, we may with truth ſay

they

they muſt begin next ſpring *de novo*. I doubt much myſelf of their being able to reduce Alſace and Lorrain, and at the ſame time hold Brabant, for this muſt cauſe a diviſion of their forces, which is a great advantage to France; for her armies every hour will not only increaſe immenſely in numbers but in diſcipline, and like unto a hydra, when one ſoldier is killed ten freſh ones are ready to fill his place. As to the combined forces conquering France and eſtabliſhing the old deſpotic government, or reinſtating the Emigrant Princes, it is not to be done. How can 120,000 men be ſo abſurd as to imagine they can conquer above 20 millions of ſouls unanimous? it is impoſſible. They may kill many thouſands and diſtreſs many thouſands more; but ſubdue ſuch a populous nation is not on the military cards; it is too abſurd an idea, and will not bare one moment's argument. If they wiſhed to obtain any ſolid advantages to themſelves from the diſtreſſed ſituation of the French nation, they ſhould have contented themſelves with attempting to hold Brabant, which was already in the poſſeſſion of Auſtria, and have tried to ſubdue Alſace and Lorrain. Here appears to me

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very ſtrange jumble of intereſts. Auſtria already in the poſſeſſion of Brabant, and Pruſſia and Auſtria both mutually co-operating to reduce Alſace and Lorrain. What was Pruſſia out of theſe conqueſts to have? Was ſhe to have nothing ceded to her? There appears ſuch a complete mixture of intereſts in theſe operations, and not being acquainted with the private intrigues of cabinets, I cannot form any judgement further than in the end, like two dogs, I think they were moſt likely to quarrel for the bone. I am certain Pruſſia would not wiſh to poſſeſs Alſace and Lorrain, as it is too far detached from her dominions; and to maintain them, it would ſo much divide her forces, that ſhe is too wiſe to attempt ſuch a poſſeſſion; and I think it very improbable that ſhe would aſſiſt in conquering Alſace and Lorraine to deliver it to the Auſtrians, unleſs they, in return, were to cede a great part of Sileſia, or ſome other territory, in return to Pruſſia, contiguous to her preſent poſſeſſions. Certain it is, that there is a miſunderſtanding between the invading powers, which time will bring to light; in the mean time I ſhall content myſelf with this

one remark; that Auſtria, in the end, is likely to be the greateſt ſufferer by the loſs of Brabant.

As I have already pointed out what Auſtria and Pruſſia *jointly* might do were they determined to act vigorouſly in concert with each other, I ſhall now proceed to ſhew how Auſtria will find herſelf ſituated with France and Brabant, ſuppoſing Pruſſia ſhall withdraw her forces and render her no further aſſiſtance, which the preſent face of affairs ſtrongly indicate.

I ſhall be happy to be informed by any officer who poſſeſſes military knowledge, how it will be poſſible for the Auſtrians to retain their poſſeſſions in Brabant (if Pruſſia ſhall withdraw her forces and ceaſe to co-operate any further with her). When a large French force ſhall move againſt them into Brabant from French Flanders to ſupport and inſtigate a general revolt; and another army directly down the Meuſe, on the ſouth-eaſt ſide, to take poſſeſſion of that river, ſo as to hinder any proviſions being afforded the Auſtrian garriſons and army by that quarter. All Brabant in arms, with

a powerful

a powerful French army in their country to ſupport them, will render it impoſſible for the Auſtrians to ſupply themſelves any longer from the country of Brabant; and the other French army, which we ſuppoſe to move down the ſouth ſide of the Meuſe will abſolutely be between the Auſtrian fortreſſes in Brabant, and every depot they can have in the county of Luxembourg or the Rhine, and will cut off all ſtores and proviſions from that quarter. From whence elſe can they be fed? from Holland. But the moment the French and Brabanters get poſſeſſion of the Scheld, their communication with Holland will alſo be intercepted. If the French and the Brabanters will only operate on the Auſtrian line of communication, and uſe every exertion to hinder their being ſupplied with proviſions, the Auſtrians will ſhortly be ſhut up and entangled amongſt their fortreſſes; and as miracles have ceaſed, and it is not likely it ſhould rain ſalt pork and peck loaves, when the magazines already laid in are expended, they muſt either retreat, ſtarve, or capitulate. But if the French and Brabanters ſhould grow imprudently bold,

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from great prospects of success, and the immense superiority of numbers they will be able to bring into the field, and should deliver a general battle, they may be beaten from the great discipline and order that prevails in the Austrian army; and, by the loss of one signal battle, they may in one day throw away what they will not in some months be able to repair. But if they will be contented with perpetually skirmishing with the enemy, and harassing them whenever an opportunity offers, and never deliver battle, but act on their flanks, and on their line of communication with ther depots, their efforts must in the end be crowned with success. An intelligent officer may say, how will a French army move down the Meuse and be able to feed themselves from *their* depots on their frontiers whilst the fortress of Luxembourg remains in the hands of the Austrians, and directly on their right flank and rear? I reply, that Luxembourg is a well fortified town, and able to stand a siege, but it is not necessary for the whole of the French army, destined for that particular service, to halt and besiege that town; they may mask or block-

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ade * it with a corps ſuperior to the garriſon, a method that our celebrated General moſt particularly recommends when you cannot ſtay to beſiege a town, and operations of great conſequence call you elſewhere.

But there is a more material circumſtance than any I have hitherto mentioned, which muſt, in the end, ſooner or later, terminate in the loſs of Brabant to the Auſtrians, for the ſame reaſons by which our celebrated General accounts for the loſs of Alſace and Lorrain, to whoſe works I refer you †; and ſhall proceed with commenting on and apply-

* The Duke of Brunſwick might have acted thus at Thionville, if he ever intended to attempt a move towards Paris:—he would have gained much time, which, in the ſituation of affairs then, was of every conſequence.

† We have already ſhewn that France has great advantages in attacking Flanders from the proximity of its depots, which are greatly encreaſed by the Auſtrian *line of operation* from Vienna to Bruſſels (a diſtance of above 300 miles), which *makes it impoſſible for them to preſerve that country.* It was no doubt owing to this circumſtance chiefly, if not intirely, that the

Houſe

applying his remarks to the preſent ſituation of the Auſtrian troops in Brabant. Every freſh ſupply, except proviſions, muſt come from Vienna to the Auſtrian army in Brabant; namely, cannon, and all other military ſtores, horſes, recruits, cloathing, ſmall and great, arms, and accoutrements; all theſe muſt be brought above 300 miles. The very expence itſelf of ſupplying an army with every thing neceſſary for it on a line of communication of 300 miles, is ſufficient of itſelf to ruin the cauſe. France, on the contrary, has every thing cloſe at hand; ſhe can be eaſily ſupplied with all ſorts of ſtores from many of her fortreſſes that are on the borders of her frontier, and cloſe to Brabant and the country of Luxembourg; and I will, with confidence, aſſert, that where France expends one pound, it ſhall coſt Auſtria at leaſt ſeven or ten times that ſum; (the Reader ſhould underſtand I mean in all ſupplies ſent from Vienna, a diſtance of 300 miles); when France

Houſe of Auſtria could not preſerve Alſace, Franche Compte, and Lorrain, which will finally bring on the loſs of Flanders. —Lloyd, vol. ii. page 160.

can

can be ſupplied with every ſtore ſhe may require at a very ſhort diſtance, I may almoſt ſay, on the very ſpot: what an immenſe advantage this muſt be to France. Our celebrated General ſo expreſsly points out the advantages of the army that acts on a ſhort line of operation, and the diſadvantages of the other which act on a long line of operation; and plainly proves that the latter, however ſuperior, muſt, from the length of its line of operation, in the end, be ruined. In ſhort, all his remarks tend to prove the immenſe, (nay, inſurmoutable) diſadvantages Auſtria has to encounter in that country, that I am clearly of opinion the beſt thing the Auſtrians can do, provided the Pruſſians will no longer co-operate with them, is to withdraw their forces from Brabant, as they cannot keep poſſeſſion of that country for any time, but by an immenſe expenditure of blood and treaſure, and in the end will not gain their point, but be driven out at laſt, if the Brabanters take up arms, and the French are determined to act with all their power againſt the Houſe of Auſtria in that quarter, and ſupport them vigorouſly.

Before

Before I proceed to ſhew the mutual intereſt of Brabant and France, when allied, I ſhall ſtate the immediate operations that are likely to take place. The very moment the Brabanters and French have taken poſſeſſion of the river Scheld, and alſo of the Meuſe below the moſt exterior fortreſs the Auſtrians poſſeſs on that river, all ſupplies of proviſions are cut off from Holland by the former river, and from the Rhine by the latter (by water I mean). Now I will aſk any Officer when their preſent magazines are exhauſted, how are they to be ſupplied in future? he will ſay, of courſe, from the Rhine, through the county of Luxembourg. Now Namur is certainly the beſt place for theſe proviſions to be brought to: and Namur is above 120 miles from the neareſt point on the Rhine, namely Coblentz, or Cologne. General Lloyd ſays, it is impoſſible for any army whatever to feed itſelf on a line of communication of 100 miles. I will be ſo bold as to preſume the ſame, as I am certain I cannot have more able authority. Pleaſe to recollect alſo, that the fortreſs of Luxembourg is above 80 miles from Namur. Theſe methods purſued, the Auſtrians

muſt

muſt abſolutely ſtarve. The French and Brabanters have only to take ſtrong poſitions, remain quiet, and not deliver any general action, but harraſs the enemy in every quarter, and uſe every endeavour to cut off any future ſupply of proviſions or ſtores by acting on their line of communication wherever it may come from. For ſtrong poſts, well fortified with temporary redoubts and intrenchments, and well ſupplied with artillery (of which the French have the beſt in the world), now a days, generally decide the fate of countries. Battles are ſeldom of much if of any advantage. Mareſchal Saxe ſays, they are the reſources of weak generals. Look to the wars of the Great King of Pruſſia, you will find various inſtances of this nature. The Ruſſians twice, after two ſignal actions gained over the King's army, were forced to retreat from whence they came for want of proviſions. Their *line of operation* was *too long*, they could not *ſupport* their army on it, and General Lloyd very juſtly condemns the Great Frederick for delivering them battle; for had he took up ſome ſtrong poſition, and waited only 10 days longer, the Ruſſians muſt have retreated or have ſtarved. Marſhal Daun's army

 was

was in the very ſame predicament as the Ruſſians, when he attempted a co-operation with them; his *line of operation* was *ſo long* he could not feed his army for *any time*, and retreated *only* for the want of proviſions.

Proviſions are the ſole and only ſpring of war, and that army which can have them cloſe at hand, whilſt the enemy is obliged to bring them from a great diſtance, muſt in the end prevail. One ſingle convoy coming to the King of Pruſſia's army (at the ſiege of Olmutz) being deſtroyed by the Auſtrians, made the king that very ſame evening raiſe the ſiege, break up his camp, retreat and evacuate a tract of country for which he had been fighting two campaigns. And if Marſhal Vendome had followed the advice given him by the Duke of Berwick, and had attacked and defeated that immenſe convoy coming from Bruſſels to the Duke of Marlborough's army when he lay near Menin, and before Prince Eugene had joined him, the great Duke of Marlborough never could have beſieged Liſle that year, but muſt have retreated immediately over the Scheld, and that

campaign

campaign would have turned out as advantageous to the French as it did to the allies, as the great object they had in view for that campaign would have been defeated. Vide Memoirs de Berwick, tom. II.

I have already obſerved that, when the French and Brabanters ſhall get poſſeſſion of the Scheld and the Meuſe (I do not mean the mouth of the Meuſe as any poſition below Namur will be to effect), that the Auſtrians will be totally deprived of ſupplying themſelves with proviſions either from the country of Brabant, or from Holland, which, in the end, (if the French and Brabanters will only act on their line of operation, and not deliver battle, or oppoſe them in front), muſt finiſh in their ruin. Theſe meaſures, ſo deciſive and deſtructive in the end to the Auſtrians, may not be ſo ſpeedily put in execution from the ſeaſon being ſo far advanced, and winter haſtily approaching. But I am induced to riſk an opinion that the Auſtrians may immediately be much circumſcribed in their poſſeſſions, and embarraſſed in their operations in Brabant, and be reduced to act on a

moſt contracted ſcale. The idea I have taken from the following lines in General Lloyd's Works:

Lloyd, Vol. II. Page 156. "This part of the "French frontier line is ſtronger by art than na- "ture, having a prodigious number of ſtrong "fortreſſes and poſts upon it; moreover, it pro- "jects in many places, ſo that an enemy can enter "it no where, without having ſome of them in "front and on his flanks, his depots muſt be at "Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of "forty thouſand men placed on the Sambre, and "another of equal force about Condé, will ſo bridle "his operations, that he cannot advance a ſtep with- "out eminent danger; for that, which we ſup- "poſe on the Sambre, by maſking Namur, pene- "trates into the country to Bruſſels, &c. which "will force the enemy to retire and abandon his "own frontier."

Although the General in the foregoing lines applies this manœuvre *only* to the defence of the French frontier, I cannot ſee why, in part, it may not

not be adopted in the invaſion of Brabant; as for inſtance, ſuppoſe Tournay or Mons to be attacked by the French, which they are moſt likely to be from their very exterior ſituation on the extremities of the Auſtrian frontier, the main Auſtrian army muſt either totally leave thoſe places to their deſtiny of being beſieged and taken, or blockaded and ſtarved, or muſt move to their reiief. If the Auſtrian army ſhould move to the relief of either of thoſe places, I am of opinion that a ſtrong corps moving over the river Sambre, by maſking Namur and penetrating into the country of Bruſſels, will ſo effectually act on their line of communication with their depots, that I think they will ſoon be obliged to return to protect that part of the country, and to be near to their magazines. Any how, in this caſe, they will have two evils, of which they may chuſe the leaſt; either to abandon Mons and Tournay to the will of the enemy, or to leave the country of Bruſſels to the incurſions of that corps which moves into it over the river Sambre. I confeſs I am of opinion that ſuch an operation would embarraſs them much and put them to the greateſt diſtreſs.

I ſhall

I ſhall now leave the Auſtrians to extricate themſelves from the difficulties which, by our celebrated General's aſſiſtance, I have been able to point out; and ſhall proceed to ſhew the advantages which the Brabanters and French will mutually derive from a friendly alliance.

When firſt, by the aſſiſtance of General Lloyd's Works, I undertook to inveſtigate the intereſts of France (I mean in a military point of view; for the intrigues of cabinets may baffle every military maxim laid down by him, and beat all human foreſight), I was of opinion that France, before ſhe ſheathed the ſword, ſhould extend her Frontier Line to the banks of the Rhine; but, from more mature deliberation, I am enclined to believe this great advantage, which would place her in eternal ſecurity from invaſions from the German Powers, may be poſtponed until a future occaſion (I mean until ſhe has more firmly ſettled her interior government, *when nothing then can hinder her*). France, by the immediate liberation of Brabant, and an alliance with that power, may acquire almoſt every military advantage and ſe-

curity

curity the ſame as if ſhe had actually extended her frontier to the Rhine, which I ſhall attempt to prove. The preſent Frontier Line of France runs from Baſle on the Upper Rhine to Dunkerque on the Channel, a diſtance of about 460 miles, for the particulars of which, and the ſtrength of it, I refer you to the adjoining note *, extracted from

Lloyd, Vol. II. Page 154.—The frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Baſil, in Switzerland, and runs in various directions from thence to Dunkirk, in French Flanders. I ſhall divide this long line into three parts, and conſider each of them ſeparately. The firſt part goes from Baſil to Landau, and covers Alſatia; it is near 130 miles in length. The ſecond part goes from Landau to Sedan, on the Moſelle, covers Lorrain on the ſide of the electorate of Treves, the dutchies of Deux-Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in length. From Sedan down the Meuſe to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about 150 miles; ſo that this whole frontier is about 470 miles.

The firſt part of this line is covered by the Rhine, on which are placed Hunninghen, New Briſac, Straſburg, and Landau, all which are very ſtrong. Straſburg has a bridge over the Rhine; on the back part of Alſace runs a chain of mountains, which ſeparates it from Franche Compté and Lorrain; the diſtance

from General Lloyd's Works, to which I requeſt the military reader will give the *greateſt* attention; and,

diſtance between theſe mountains is from ten to fifteen miles. An army encamped near Straſburgh, covered by the Rhine and the fortreſſes above-mentioned, could with eaſe prevent an enemy from paſſing that river, or at leaſt from beſieging any of them, and without taking them all, he could not poſſibly ſeparate his army and take his winter quarters in Alſace, while the French have any conſiderable force encamped or cantoned in the mountains above-mentioned. I am therefore ſurprized the Auſtrians ever made any attempt on that ſide, and much more ſo, that the French were ſo very much alarmed at it. For my part, I am confident that an able general, at the head of thirty or forty thouſand men, ſo far from being terrified at the approach of an enemy, or oppoſing his paſſing the Rhine, would wiſh to ſee him ſhut up between the mountains, the river, and the fortreſſes; becauſe he would ſee the facility of preventing his repaſſing it at all, and of cutting him off entirely. Look at the map and judge.

The ſecond part of the French frontier, viz. the line which goes from Landau to Sedan, is very ſtrong both by nature and art, having ſeveral ſtrong places on it; and the country before it is no leſs difficult, being very mountainous, and conſequently full of narrow paſſes. The direction of this line is concave towards that part of Germany; ſo that an enemy who advances on

and, at the ſame time, look to the map, and judge with what a maſterly hand that Officer treats on this ſubject,

on that ſide muſt have his depots on the Rhine, at Mentz, or Coblentz, or at Maeſtricht and Namur on the Meuſe; in both caſes the army, which I ſuppoſe encamped at Landau, can hinder him from advancing from the Rhine, by acting on his line of operation on that ſide, while another of forty thouſand men, placed on the Meuſe near Sedan, will prevent any army from advancing into Lorrain or Champaign on that ſide, as is evident from the inſpection of the map.

Whether we conſider the ſtrength of this line, the direction of it, or finally, the obſtacles which the country before it offers, it will appear that no enemy can approach it, much leſs attack it with any proſpect of ſucceſs: a ſmall corps poſted at Luxemburgh, might indeed advance from thence, and ravage a few villages in haſte, but no ſolid enterprize can, we think, ever be executed on that ſide.

The third and laſt part of the French frontier runs from Sedan down the Meuſe to Charlemont, and from thence to Dunkirk, and is 150 miles in length. It has been the ſcene of ſucceſſive wars for near two centuries, the moſt expenſive, bloody, and durable of any recorded in the annals of mankind, of which the author propoſes giving the hiſtory on the ſame plan this work is wrote.

ſubject, not giving his own opinion only, but ſtating the moſt undeniable facts atteſted and proved

This line is ſtronger by art than nature, having a prodigious number of ſtrong fortreſſes and poſts upon it; moreover, it projects in many places, ſo that an enemy can enter it no where, without having ſome of them in front and on his flanks, his depots muſt be at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thouſand men placed on the Sambre, and another of equal force about Condé, will ſo bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a ſtep without imminent danger; for that, which we ſuppoſe on the Sambre, by maſking Namur, penetrates into the country to Bruſſels, &c. which will force the enemy to retire and abandon his own frontier. In the preſent ſtate of Auſtrian Flanders, and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from over-running the above-mentioned countries in one campaign.

In the war for the ſucceſſion of Spain, at the begining of this century, *ten ſucceſsful campaigns brought the Allies no farther than Landrecy, not thirty miles* from the Auſtrian frontiers, a very inconſiderable defeat at Denain obliged Prince Eugene to raiſe the ſiege of that place, and in a ſhort time abandoned his conqueſts, the fruits of many victories.

I know moſt people ſuppoſe, that this was owing to the defection of the Engliſh: had this never taken place, perhaps the

proved by the iſſue of various expenſive and bloody wars. If France cannot immediately, or does not chuſe

the Allies might in time have advanced to the Marne, and ſent parties to the Seyne: but will any officer ſuppoſe, that any army marching that line from Mons, Tournay, &c. could ſeparate and take winter quarters on the above-mentioned rivers, while the French were in poſſeſſion of Picardy, Normandy, and Champaign? No, it is impoſſible: the great fault of the French generals, when on the defenſive, was to oppoſe the enemy in front, whereas they ſhould have operated againſt their flanks.

The final event of this long and bloody war ſhews the ſtrength of this frontier, and the prodigious reſources of the Houſe of Bourbon. From the deſcription we have of the French frontier towards Germany and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears, that an enemy, though his dominions were on the Upper Rhine, oppoſite to Alſace, would find it extremely difficult, or rather impoſſible, to conquer that province, from whence alone he could penetrate into Lorrain, &c.

That the ſecond part of the French frontier, from Landau to the Meuſe, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up the Moſelle, between the Rhine and the Meuſe, the event of the different wars, waged in Flanders, prove the ſuperiority of the French, I mean the *ſuperior advantages they poſſeſs in acting on that frontier, which are indeed ſo very*

 great,

chuſe at preſent, to attempt the poſſeſſion of thoſe countries which lay between her preſent frontier and the Rhine, ſhe is more doubly bound to liberate Brabant from the Auſtrian power, and to form an alliance with her; for, by expelling the Auſtrians from Brabant, ſhe will place a moſt populous, rich, and formidable nation between her Netherlands and every invading German power from the north to the north-eaſt point of her dominions, and, by this excellent and proper alliance, ſhe ſhortens her frontier line at leaſt 160 miles, and will only have to protect her frontier from between Charlemont and Sedan to Baſil on the Upper Rhine, which will *curtail* her frontier line nearly *one third* in extent. Let me intreat the military reader to look to the map and judge what an advantage this alone would be, if no other was to accrue to her from this alliance: but I hope to be able to point out ſome of more con-

great, that no forces can be collected and ſupported in Flanders by the houſe of Auſtria, the Engliſh, Dutch, and the German Princes, which can preſerve that country againſt the efforts of the French; *moſt certainly the Auſtrians alone cannot do it.*

ſequence.

ſequence. Every officer who has read and ſtudied the Hiſtory of the Wars in Brabant for the invaſion of France, on that quarter, muſt acknowledge, that, to attack the French Netherlands, or to penetrate into France on that ſide, the enemy muſt abſolutely have his depots at Namur on the Meuſe, and at Tournay and Mons; but when the Auſtrians ſhall be expelled from that country, and the Brabanters allied to France, all theſe fortreſſes will be in the hands of the Brabanters, together with every town on the north of the Meuſe: this at once totally hinders all operations againſt the French Netherlands, for not one ſingle man of the enemy can ever enter the French Netherlands before all Brabant is ſubdued, (which I ſhall treat of hereafter). It will now be proper to ſhew the collateral ſtrength of Brabant and France, after the expulſion of the Auſtrians. Brabant will have Namur, Mons, Tournay, &c. in their poſſeſſion, well fortified and garriſoned. Landau, Thionville, Longwy, and Sedan, all ſtrong places, and already in the poſſeſſion of the French, and in front and on the very exterior edge of their frontier line, with Metz, Straſbourg, New Briſac, and

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Huningham, in their rear, alſo fortified; from whence ſupplies of proviſions, drawn from a plentiful country behind them, may be conveyed to either of the above French fortreſſes, or to any army laying near them; this advantage alone is immenſe to the French; (and the country of Brabant is nearly ſituated alike, in that reſpect, with its fortreſſes), neither of them will ever be obliged to ſeek their proviſions at a diſtance, or have to conduct and guard large convoys of proviſions and ſtores on a *long line* of *communication*, having *many* capital depots cloſe to their armies, with each of their countries open to them in their rear; whilſt any invading power from Germany, before they can attempt to enter France, or Brabant, muſt form ſome large depots on the Rhine, or in the upper parts of the country of Luxembourg, that being the neareſt place they can form their magazines at.

For when Brabant is gone, the fall of the fortreſs of Luxembourg muſt of courſe follow (as long as Alſace and Lorrain continue in the hands of the French); for it is not poſſible for the

Auſtrians

Auſtrians to keep it, it may be ſtarved without ever being attacked. The ſtrength of the Brabanters and French will be ſo immenſe when allied and acting conjointly, that I am certain when the Auſtrian troops are once driven over the Rhine, and Brabant allied to France, it will be a moſt dangerous undertaking for any General to attempt to paſs over that river any diſtance into the country of Luxembourg to attack France between the *Moſelle and the Meuſe*, or to *paſs the Meuſe* to attack Brabant; if he does, I am of opinion that moſt likely he will never get half his army back again: but, if this ſhould not be the caſe, certain I am that he muſt retreat or ſtarve if he advances above 50 miles into the country; he will be nearly ſurrounded, as the French and Brabant armies can operate on *both his* flanks at once, and at the *ſame time* on *his line of communication* with his *depots* on the Rhine, which no army ever ſo powerful, or any general ever ſo ſkillful, can reſiſt, which I hope I ſhall be able, from the poſitions the reader will find the Brabanters, and French forces poſted, in the following pages plainly to demonſtrate. Our celebrated General points

out

out the following positions for the French forces for the protection of their *present frontier* line, which extends from Basle to Dunquerque. He proposes placing one army of forty thousand near Strasburgh, and another of forty thousand near Landau, and another of forty thousand near Sedan on the Meuse, another of forty thousand placed on the river Sambre (a branch of the Meuse), and another of forty thousand near Condé. To prove the strength of France and Brabant when allied, supposing the Austrians first of all to be driven out of Brabant, and France and Brabant acting mutually together, it will be necessary to alter the position of the northernmost armies (in case of any attack from Germany) as following, and then I will ask any military man how either of those countries can be attacked by any German power from the Rhine? The three distinct armies, each of 40 thousand men, which General Lloyd proposes placing the one at Sedan, one on the River Sambre, and one at Condé, we will dispose of as follows: the army at Sedan shall be moved forward to the neighbourhood of Thionville, (perhaps it might be better if it were advanced rather more

forward

forward ſomewhere near to Luxembourg). That army of 40 thouſand on the Sambre ſhall not replace the poſition of the one that was at Sedan, but ſhall alſo be moved forward to the neighbourhood of Thionville, and joined to the army of 40 thouſand, that was placed at Sedan, but now moved forward near to Thionville; and the one at Condé ſhall advance, and, in alliance with an army of 30 thouſand Brabanters, place itſelf near to Namur or Maſtricht. An enemy who ſhall attempt to attack France, or Brabant, will find the following armies to oppoſe them, and their poſitions will be as here under-mentioned: an army of 40 thouſand French and 30 thouſand Brabanters (70,000), poſted near Namur or Maſtricht, in Brabant; an army of 80 thouſand near Thionville, a corps of 40 thouſand near Landau, and a corps of 40 thouſand near Straſburg. Although I have made ſome alteration in the poſition of the armies from where General Lloyd places them, which I have in the foregoing lines minutely ſtated, yet the candid reader will, I hope, do me that juſtice to acknowledge, that I have moſt rigidly adhered to thoſe principles which he ſo expreſsly recommends, and

 aſſures

assures success to such officers who follow them, and points out the ruin and defeat of those who do not adhere to them, namely, posting the different corps in such a manner so that an invading enemy may be operated at one and the same time, both in flank and rear. The military reader will also plainly observe, that I have only advanced certain French corps, which an alliance with Brabant absolutely will make necessary; as the frontier line of France, in that case, will be so considerably shortened. Nor have I added one single man in addition to the forces which General Lloyd thinks necessary for the defence of those countries. I shall now point out in what various different ways the several distinct corps, posted as I have described, may be able to act against any army that may attempt to pass the Rhine, either to attack Brabant or France. An enemy that passes the Rhine with an intent either to attack Brabant or to enter France between the Meuse and the Moselle, must have their depots on those parts of the Rhine the most contiguous to their operations, which are Dusseldorf, Cologne, and Coblentz; from one or all of these places they *must* be fed. If their intent

be

be to march to the Meuse, and to pass that river to attack Brabant, they will find an army of 70,000 French and Brabanters near Mastricht, or Namur, ready to move to any point to receive them and dispute the passage of that river, whilst the army of 80,000 near Thionville, may, with two thirds of their force, (say, 60,000) move forward and place themselves on their left flank, keeping their own left close to the river Meuse, either to reinforce the army on the other side of that river, opposed to the enemy in front, or to be reinforced from that army over the Meuse, just as circumstances may require, and send the remaining 20,000 down the Moselle, whilst at the same time 20,000 from the army of 40,000 posted at Landau, shall move forward cross that river, and in conjunction with the detachment from the Thionville army, place themselves absolutely in the rear, and directly between the enemy and their line of communication with their depot: I will ask any officer how it is possible for an invading army to remain a moment in such a situation with 70,000 men to oppose them in front, 60,000 on their left flank, and 40,000

acting on their line of communication with their depots? They must retreat or starve. Now, *vice versa*, if the enemy's intent shall be instead of attacking Brabant to move down between the Meuse and the Moselle, and attempt to enter France by the way of Longwy, Sedan, or Charlemont, the army of 80,000 near Thionville will be ready to move forward and oppose their operations, whilst the army of French and Brabanters of 70,000 laying near Namur or Mastricht may pass the Meuse and take some position on the right flank of the enemy with 40,000, and detach the other 30,000 to act on their line of operation with their depots on the Rhine. A detachment of 20,000 from the army at Landau may also move forward just the same in this case as in the former just mentioned. In this situation they will have an army of 80,000 to oppose them in front, and one of 40,000 on their right flank, with 50,000 operating on their line of communication, with their depots in their rear. In this situation I am convinced they are more dangerously situated than in the former, because if they advance at all to attempt any solid operations against France, their line of

operation

operation will be considerably longer, and of course attended with more difficulties and dangers. Will any officer suppose an enemy can advance into the country of France, or any other country on the face of the earth, when they can be operated on in the manner I have pointed out above? No; it is impossible. Our celebrated General assures you to the contrary; and not only gives it as his opinion, but proves most plainly, by various instances in the wars of which he treats in his Works, that every General who has been able, from the situation of the country, to act according to these principles (namely, not to oppose an enemy solely in front, but to post a strong corps on his flanks, and operate also on his line of communication with his depots), that General has ever been successful, when his line of operation has been short and the enemy's very long, and most particularly and most assuredly when he has had the choise of several lines to act on, by all which he can feed his army, and the invading enemy have been forced to adhere to one line of operation, which must ever be the case of an army that invades a country. The military reader may justly observe, that in every situation

I have

I have detached too large a body of troops from the two main armies to act on the enemy's line of communication with their depots in the rear. My only motive was to ſhew the great powers of Brabant and France when allied, and that they were well able, after detaching ſo conſiderable a corps to reſiſt the foe in every ſituation. For I know full well that twenty thouſand men, or at moſt twenty-five thouſand, are ſufficient to act on any enemy's line of communication, let his army be ever ſo numerous, provided the greater part of them are light troops, ſuch as light infantry, chaſſeurs, dragoons, and huſſars. For, if the enemy ſhould detach a very large force to protect their convoys, the Brabanters and French can with eaſe, and with much greater ſafety, detach alſo.

There remains yet another way by which an enemy may attack the French poſſeſſions, but I think it full as bad, if not worſe, than either of the two former; I mean between the Moſelle and the Rhine: in this caſe they moſt likely will have their depots at Mayence, Worms, and Manheim (all on the Rhine). But I ſhould like to be informed

how

how they can advance into Alſace or Lorrain, when an army of 80,000 lays near Thionville, and another of 40,000 at Landau, I mean ſo as to penetrate any diſtance into either country, and execute any ſolid operations. I will be reſponſible, that if they ever advance twenty miles beyond the frontier line between Thionville and Landau, that all communication will be cut off between them and their depots by detachments from both or either of the two French armies, and they muſt, in the end, retreat with diſgrace and loſs. All they can do is to attack ſome fortreſs cloſe on the frontier, and when they have taken one proceed to attack another fortreſs, and ſo on; for they can never take poſſeſſion of thoſe countries, or be able to winter their troops in them, before they have reduced all the great fortreſſes: and it will be of no uſe to them to march into thoſe countries in ſummer, and be obliged to march out again when winter approaches. But this is a work of infinite labour and toil indeed; and if they ſhould adopt this plan, the French can bring a conſiderable reinforcement from their army in Brabant, and concentrate nearly their whole forces to act againſt them.

them. As to an army entering Alsace over the Rhine, near to Strasbourg, or New Brisac (where also an army of 40,000 are posted), I shall refer the military reader to General Lloyd's Works for his opinion of an attack on France by that quarter. He deems it impracticable. For me to give his reasons will enlarge this book considerably, which already is swelling greater in extent than I intended at first. I shall conclude with briefly making one observation, on which General Lloyd throughout his whole works lays so much stress. In all these various operations I have pointed out where an enemy may attack Brabant or France. The enemy can *only* act on *one long line of Operation* when both the Brabanters and French have *many* lines of operation to act on, *all very short*, and their *Depots close at hand*. This advantage *alone*, if there were no other, our celebrated General plainly proves is sufficient, in the end, to baffle and defeat the projects of the most able General at the head of a numerous and well disciplined army. I intreat the reader to look to the map whilst perusing this book, for, without attending

to

to it, it will be impoſſible for him to form any judgement.

A very droll idea has juſt entered my head: I muſt indulge it. I acknowledge I have no other reaſon for ſuſpecting it but my own fancy.

It is plainly to be percieved, that a good underſtanding ſubſiſts between the Pruſſians and the French. For no lady of faſhion can be more civil to you when you call her carriage, and hand her out of the Opera, than the Pruſſians have been to the French whilſt they were handing them out of France. By the laſt accounts the Pruſſians had poſſeſſion of Luxembourgh, and their troops were not marched out of that country. Now, if an alliance really ſhall have taken place between Pruſſia and France (I only ſuppoſe it), and Pruſſia ſhould at once throw off the maſk, and declare in favour of France, and keep a conſiderable part of her forces in the country of Luxembourg. By heavens! the Auſtrians in Brabant are all caught in a net; not one mother's ſon of them can ever repaſs the Rhine to Vienna; they muſt be all taken to a man. Juſt

the ſame as when a fiſherman ſees a large ſhoal of fiſhes paſs with the flood-tide through a narrow channel into ſhoal water, he lays his net accroſs, and waits till low water, when he turns in and ſhovels them out on the dry ſands by cart loads. This indeed would be the moſt perfect coup de maitre that was ever invented. It ſtands on the military cards, and may with eaſe be played. The biter would be ſo truly bitten. Nor do I ſee any reaſon why it ſhould not take place. I confeſs it prepoſſeſſes my ideas much; for great nations always act according to their intereſts, and are not the leaſt ſcrupulous of breaking treaties or engagements when they ſee it is contrary to their intereſt to keep them. Great nations have many individuals amongſt them, who, as individuals, are men of the greateſt honour and probity. But great nations (ſpeaking politically of them), are great rogues in their tranſactions with their natural enemy; ſo are great miniſters and great generals, although, in their private characters, "*they are all honourable men*;" but, when acting for the ſtate, he that deceives the moſt, and, by that deceit, can gain the greateſt advantage, has ever been accounted

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the moſt able ſtateſman and the greateſt general. But, this is all chimerical, and merely the effuſion of my own fancy; but, if it were to take place, it would be truly laughable.

EXTENSION OF THE FRENCH FRONTIER TO THE LOWER RHINE.

I THINK it is not at all neceſſary for the French at this moment to pay any great attention to the immediate extenſion of their frontier line to the river Rhine; as, in their preſent ſituation, it can be of but little conſequence or advantage to them, which I hope I have fully proved in the ſuppoſed alliance between Brabant and France, (the Auſtrians being driven out of Brabant); as in a future time (not long diſtant) nothing can hinder the French at their leiſure from extending their frontier to that river. The only immediate object the French ought to have in view is to inſtigate and vigorouſly ſupport a general revolt in Brabant, and to compel the Auſtrian forces in Brabant to re-paſs the river Meuſe. The moment they ſhall have ſuc-

ceeded in this attempt, I will be ſo bold as to aſſert they need not trouble themſelves at preſent any further about the extenſion of their frontier to the Rhine, that will come of courſe; for the Auſtrians, when they once have been driven over the Meuſe out of Brabant, can hold the country of Luxembourg but a very ſhort time: they may indeed poſſeſs the upper part of the Duchy of Juliers for a ſhort time, and in God's name let them ſtay there if they chuſe it till they are tired:—I hope I have been able to prove, by the poſitions I have pointed out, namely, of one large army of French and Brabanters ſtationed between Namur and Maſtricht, another army of French near Thionville, and another French corps near Landau, that the difficulties will be immenſe to any German power invading either Brabant or France in thoſe parts over the Rhine; and I truſt the military reader will alſo eaſily perceive that the Auſtrians once driven over the Meuſe will find themſelves juſt in the ſame predicament; I ſhould imagine they would very ſoon of their own accord evacuate the Duchy of Juliers, without any compulſion; for, having once loſt Brabant, the poſſeſſion of the upper parts of Juliers

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can be of no consequence or advantage to them. Strengthened by these various circumstances, I now repeat again my first proposition, that the French at present ought to have no other object in view but forcing the Austrians over the river Meuse; that being accomplished, every other advantage will follow of course. The moment they are forced to retreat over the Meuse, the sooner they march to Vienna the better for them. I shall finish my remarks on the future extension of the French frontier to the river Rhine, with observing what an immense advantage would accrue to them (and also to the Brabanters) by a great river running along their frontier, *navigable* for a considerable distance, and *unfordable* for some *hundred miles*; a river which no prudent general would wish to pass either to attack Brabant or France, between the rivers Meuse and Moselle, or between the Moselle and that part of the Rhine from Landau until the Moselle runs into it. An attack over the Rhine on the country of Alsace I have also treated of, and shall not repeat it.

This

This Book has been conſiderably delayed in the Preſs from my having been confined to my houſe for a fortnight, and not able to go out to hurry the Printer, and attend to the correction of the Preſs: and, as events have taken place in Brabant ſince the day it was delivered to the Printer, namely, the 3d of November, for the ſatisfaction both of the Reader and myſelf, I am induced to mention that I read the whole of this book to my friend Dr. Moſeley on the 3d of November, the day it was delivered to the Printer; and that Col. Bath, whoſe active ſervices are well known in Brabant, at my requeſt, did me the favour to call at my houſe when I was confined to my room, and permitted me to read it to him three or four days before the above-mentioned period, either on the laſt day of October, or the 1ſt of November, I cannot ſay which. It is with theſe Gentlemen's permiſſion I bring forward their names.

The following obſervations on the intended march of the Duke of Brunſwick to Paris I have finiſhed at my leiſure, as they have no connection with the foregoing part of this Book, but treat

only

only of operations that a long time paſt have been decided.

OF THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK'S INTENDED MARCH TO PARIS.

WHEN the Duke of Brunſwick arrived at Coblentz, and took upon him the command of the Combined Forces, many perſons in this country, from the high opinion they poſſeſſed of his well-known abilities, were ſo prepoſſeſſed even in his name, that France was, in their opinion, already conquered. The repute and renown of his military talents was ſo great, and in ſuch high eſtimation, that his perſonal appearance even, I believe, would have been deemed ſufficient, by many credulous people in this country, (they were ſo infatuated with his military character), that, had his Serene Highneſs alone rode booted and ſpurred into France, they would have imagined all the fortreſſes would have been delivered to him by a nod from his head; and that the whole French forces were to be vanquiſhed and diſperſed by the waive

of

of his hand; and that, like unto the great Leviathan, when it appears on the ocean, not only the little fishes hide their heads, but the mighty whale seeks the shoal waters for safety.

Great as my respect and opinion was of his military character, I never was of that opinion; and can bring many public characters, of the strictest honour and veracity, to witness, that, from the very beginning, I thought it impossible for the Duke of Brunswick to feed an army on *so long* and *extensive* a *line* of *operation*. The following reasons I gave, which I acquired from the Works of General Lloyd, by whose military rules and observations I began seriously to investigate the intended march of the Duke of Brunswick to Paris *,

* Any person, who will give himself the trouble of studying General Lloyd's Description of the Frontier Line of France, will find how difficult it is to enter France; and, in other parts of his Works, he gives you many instances of all Generals having been foiled in their undertakings who have attempted to enter a country in the manner the Duke of Brunswick did, leaving all the fortresses on his rear untaken, and forced to act on so long a line of operation.

and

and by whoſe obſervations and inſtructions I was guided in that operation, and in every other on which I have written. I have obſerved that Coblentz, from whence the Duke of Brunſwick firſt ſtarted, was nearly 300 miles from Paris, a diſtance ſo immenſe, that it was totally impoſſible for any army to be fed on ſo long *a line* of *operation*.

I hope the Reader will not ſuppoſe that I am ſo ignorant as to imagine that the Duke of Brunſwick's army was to be ſupplied, had he arrived in the neighbourhood of Paris, from the place he firſt moved his troops from; but it muſt be acknowledged, that his army was ſupplied from the Rhine for a very conſiderable diſtance through the country of Luxembourg, until he arrived near Verdun, when he was at the extremity of his communication with the Moſelle and the Meuſe, I mean in that quarter. From Verdun he was to have proceeded to Paris, a diſtance of at leaſt 130 miles, which was one line on which he might have fed his army, as he had no other reſource for proviſions but from the aſſiſtance of the Auſtrians

in Brabant; and that was the beſt way he could have fed his army, as there were too many obſtacles, amounting almoſt to impoſſibilities, from the former quarter. Theſe ſupplies muſt have come either from Tournay, Mons, or Namur, moſt probable from all. Judge only the diſtance of thoſe places from Paris, and then determine on the difficulties he muſt have ſuſtained to feed his army either by the aſſiſtance of the Auſtrians from Brabant, or from thoſe parts of the rivers Meuſe or Moſelle, and the country of Luxembourg, by which he entered France.

When he arrived near Verdun, and every thing appeared for the moment in his favour, in the common courſe of converſation, in a *moſt reſpectable* company, I was aſked my opinion. I ſaid that great things might be expected from the known and proved military talents of the Duke of Brunſwick; but, contrary to every military rule, he had paſſed into France, leaving many fortreſſes and every fortreſs untaken (nor had he even maſked any one of them), that lay not only directly on his *line of operation*, but *alſo* both on the *right* and *left*

flank

flank of his *line of operation*, which no other experienced General had ever attempted with ſucceſs; and every General, that had acted ſo imprudently had ever been foiled in his operations, according to General Lloyd's ideas (by whom I ever have and ſhall be guided). He gives various inſtances and proofs of the bad ſucceſs and defeat of Generals who have acted in the like manner. I alſo went ſo far as to give it as my opinion, that if the Duke of Brunſwick ſhould be ſo fortunate, by a general action, totally to defeat and diſperſe the whole French army, and, by a forced march, move on to the neighbourhood of Paris, that, even after ſo ſucceſsful an event, he never could remain any time at or near that Capital; for, as long as the French could keep any army in the field, although they ſhould not be able to oppoſe his forward operations, yet, *by acting* on his *line of operation*, they would very ſhortly *force him to retreat for want of proviſions*, and every military ſtore requeſted for the ſupport of ſuch an army; for it was impoſſible he could carry all thoſe requiſites with him; to effect it he muſt have had by far

more waggons than ſoldiers in his army, an idea too ridiculous to think of one moment, and which I ſhould not have even mentioned, had not a perſon in a company where I was when I made the preceding obſervations anſwered in reply to me, that I might be aſſured the Duke of Brunſwick would not want proviſions, for at that moment he was moving on and carrying proviſions with him for *the whole campaign.* I gave him no anſwer but left him to enjoy his abſurd and impracticable idea. Although I have given my opinion on a tranſaction that is paſſed, yet I defy any reader ever ſo malicious to prove that I have advanced one ſingle opinion now that I did not publickly expreſs before the event took place; as I can bring many reſpectable public characters to vouch for the truth of my opinions, that they were the ſame before the events took place as I now have ſtated them. I claim no merit to myſelf, as my opinions were not founded on my own judgement: No; I was guided by thoſe ineſtimable rules, examples, and inſtances laid down in our celebraled General's Works; and if any officer had read and ſtudied them,

them, and applied them to the Duke of Brunſwick's operations againſt France as ſtudiouſly, and attentively as I have done, he would have been of the ſame opinion, and equally convinced with me, that the Duke had undertaken an operation which no General ever ſo ſkillful could have accompliſhed.

Having made ſeveral obſervations on what has paſſed, permit me to make a few military remarks on what might have happened if the Duke of Brunſwick, inſtead of retreating, had been enabled to advance and proceed on his way to Paris. Every officer, I truſt, will agree with me, that when he found Generals Dumourier and Kellerman ſtrongly poſted near St. Menhould, the Duke of Brunſwick could never have attempted to proſecute his march towards Paris, leaving either General Dumourier's army or General Kellerman's in *his rear*, or on *either flank* of his *line of operation and communication.* If he had thus acted, they would have ſtarved his army in a few days; what would he then have been obliged to have done?

done? he muſt have attacked General Dumourier and Kellerman, and have driven them from their ſtrong poſitions. Had he attempted this, I am convinced, if he had ſucceeded in his attack, where the French had loſt one thouſand men, his army muſt have loſt ſeven times that number; for every officer muſt know the great advantage even undiſciplined troops have, and how well they will fight, when entrenched up to their chins in a ſtrong fortified camp, and ſupported by a numerous and well ſerved train of artillery, of which the French have the fineſt and the beſt ſerved in the world. What would have been the reſult of this, had the Duke of Brunſwick ſucceeded in his attack on General Dumourier's ſtrong and well fortified poſition, and forced him from it? Why, moſt likely, General Dumourier would have loſt ſome part of his heavy cannon, and have been forced to retreat perhaps twelve, fifteen, or twenty miles, and undoubtedly would have choſen ſome other ſtrong poſition, and have thrown up entrenchments and temporary redoubts, which would have made his poſition juſt as ſtrong perhaps as it was in the latter

place.

place. The Duke of Brunſwick muſt then have acted juſt in the ſame manner as he muſt have done in the former ſituation; for ſurely he never would dare to paſs ſo large an army (or even any army of moderate force), and leave it in his rear, or on either of its flanks, for the reaſons I have already mentioned. In this way he would have been obliged to have driven General Dumourier's army two or three times perhaps from different ſtrong and fortified camps, before ever he could have approached near to Paris; by which time I may ſurely very fairly compute that, out of eighty thouſand men, by battle, ſickneſs, and deſertion, he muſt have loſt at leaſt twenty thouſand. On his arrival near Paris with ſixty thouſand men, he would have had to contend not only with General Dumourier's and Kellerman's armies, but with two hundred thouſand armed Volunteer Citizens, who (when well entrenched), though undiſciplined, in my opinion, are not to be ſneezed at. Our army in America had a convincing proof of this at Bunker's Hill.

I have

I have pointed out, in my opinion, many great and insurmountable obstacles that the Duke of Brunswick had to encounter, and cannot find any one thing in his favour the least to counterbalance them, except the discipline of his veteran troops, and his own great abilities, and shall leave the Reader to form his judgement upon them.

Having written so much on military subjects, I request permission, to make some remarks on the French Revolution, the *present* state of this country, and what it might have been, had that Revolution not have taken place. I am astonished that there is to be found one single person in the whole British Nation, from the first nobleman to the poorest peasant that loves his native country, *who does not rejoice as much as I do* in the French Revolution. Were they not actuated by the same principles as I am (the pleasure and satisfaction of seeing not only the most despotick, most cruel, oppressive, and profuse government overturned, and liberty given to above 20 millions of souls), who, for ages, have groaned under the lash of the most oppressive tyranny),

tyranny), they ought at leaſt, if true lovers of their country, to reflect on that dagger which that diſpotick government attempted to plunge in the vitals of their country, and which would have been accompliſhed had not the French Revolution taken place. I mean the poſitive aſſurances that intriguing court gave to the Ambaſſador of Tippoo Sultan, when at Paris, that if he would break with us in India, they pledged themſelves to ſupport him in India, and to declare war againſt England, who were never ſatisfied but when able to diſturb the peace of Europe, which they have done for centuries paſt. Let every Engliſhman, who wiſhes well to his native land, look to the proſperous ſituation (at preſent) of this country, to the conqueſts made by Earl Cornwallis in the Indies, from the Sultan Tippoo breaking with us (never dreaming that a Revolution in France could take place); and, at the ſame time, let him reflect on the calamities that would have befallen, and the expences which muſt have been incurred by this nation, already too much impoveriſhed. A general war with France and Spain in Europe and the Weſt Indies; driven out of the

Carnatic by the assistance the French would have afforded the Sultan Tippoo; and confined in the East Indies to the possession of Bengal and Bombay; with the addition, perhaps, of near two hundred million more of debt (to a country already half ruined by the American war). To these distresses, perhaps with too much truth, I may suspect that a National Bankruptcy might have succeeded, which perhaps might have been followed by a total dissolution of the British Empire and Constitution. These are very serious points when we come to reflect on them; yet, to my astonishment, there are persons in this country, who do not approve of the French Revolution; but their numbers are but small when compared to the general sense of the Community at large, whom, I am certain, both approve and rejoice at it. I could enumerate many flagrant oppressions and injuries the French nation long endured; but, as it is not my intent to treat largely on politics in this Work, I shall briefly conclude with observing, that, had there been no other reason for the French throwing off their chains of Slavery, the

arbitrary

arbitrary and unequal impoſition of the *Taile*, the infamies and cruelties of the Lettres des Cachets, and the Baſtille, are ſufficient apologies not only for them but any other nation in the ſame predicament.

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